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Showing posts from April, 2014

GONZALES vs COMELEC [G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967]

FACTS: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3 – i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a Constitutional Convention of 1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can become delegates themselves to the Convention.  Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. Two cases were filed against this act of Congress:  One an is original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters simil

Enrile v Senate Electoral Tribunal

Facts: On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections. On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues having joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number not more than 25% of the total precints involved. On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation presented, the petitioner’s name dropped to the 15 th position in the senatorial race. On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen. Pimentel’s Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed sep

LAW SCHOOL NEWBIE: THINGs you ought to KNOW

1. Law school is not graduate school. Ever felt like taking a walk down memory-lane? Well, you’re in luck because the law school experience has more in common with high school than it does with other masteral or doctorate programs. On the first day, you enter the building like you own the place. You naively think you already understand the true meaning of life. And then very quickly you discover that you’re actually just an awkward and lowly 6th grader all over again. Thank goodness you can drink this time! 2. The required number of units on subjects in your undergrad. That’s the basic requirement here in the Philippines as per the CHED Memo # 46 s. 1996, that is aside from graduating from a 4 years undergrad course. You need to have English-18 units, Social Studies- 18 units, and Mathematics - 6 units . Well the thing about this requirement is that any units that you missed you can actually take it up during summer classes or along side your regular classes. Say hello to colle

Gonzales vs Henchanova [9 SCRA 230]

Facts: Respondent executive secretary (Henchanova) authorized importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources (Burma and Vietnam). Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter and president of ilo-ilo palay and corn planters association, filed and averring that in making or attempting to make importation of foreign rice are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency. Issues: Whether the importation of foreign rice can prosper? Whether the executive secretary acted within his authorities and jurisdiction? Held: The importation of foreign rice may prosper provided that there is an existing or imminent shortage of such commodity of much gravity as to constitute national emergency. This exception however was not present; therefore, the importation of foreign rice cannot prosper. The executive secretary had

Garcia v Chief of Staff [16 SCRA 120]

Facts: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action to collect a sum of money against the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of P20/mo and suffered moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine

Carmen Festejo v. Isaias Fernando [G.r. no. L-5156 march 11, 1954]

FACTS: The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. ISSUE: Whether or not this is a suit against the state? RULING: No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tor

BOP v BPEA, 1 SCRA, 340

Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General Services and Director of BOP). The complaint alleged that both the secretary of DOG and the director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor practices. Answering the complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended pending result of administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the BOP is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but of the republic performing governmental functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the BOP are “exclusively proprietary in nature,” since they receiv

USA v Guinto

Facts : The private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force station in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said base. On February 24, 1986, The U.S. Air Force through its Western Pacific Contracting Office in Okinawa Area Exchange solicited bids through the contracting officer, James F. Shaw. The Private respondents submitted their bids because they are concessionaire inside the Clark air base for several years, but the bidding was won by the defendant Ramon Dizon with objection of the private respondents because the defendant submitted bidding not mention in the solicitation. Petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse explained that bidding is not awarded to Dizon but an extension of his present contract until August 31, 1986. June 30, 1986 the private respondents file a complaint to RTC to compel PHAX and the petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon and to conduct re-bidding

Bermoy v PNC

Facts : On July 6, 1954, (24) twenty four employees from its dormitory known as Normal Hall of the Philippine Normal College, filled an action in the COF of Manila against the PNC for the recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The Solicitor General on behalf of the defendant answers and denies the latter liability. The court ordered it dismissed before the case was tried on the merits, on the ground that neither one of the defendants was a corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be sued. The plaintiffs took an appeal to Supreme Court, alleging that it was an error to dismiss their case on the ground that, R.A. No. 416 took effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC, thus created a Board of Trustees to administer the affairs as a corporation under section 13 of the amended Act 1455 (Corporate Law), with the power “to sue and to be sued in any court.” Issue: Whether or not the PNC as a government corporation can be sued. Held: The state has already given the

Santiago v Republic, 87 SCRA 294

Facts : On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed

Arcega v Court of Appeal’s [G.R. No. L-20869 August 28, 1975]

FACT: The petitioner Alicia O. Arcega, doing business under the firm name Fairmont Ice Cream Company,” filed a complaint before the court against the respondents Central Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank, for the refund from allegedly unauthorized payment made by her of the 17% special excise tax on foreign exchange. The Central Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, among others, that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, because the judgment sought will constitute a financial charge against the Government, and therefore the suit is one against the Government, which cannot prosper without its consent, and in this case no such consent has been given.  The petitioner appealed, but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground set forth in the Central Bank’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner Arcega filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution to which an opposition was filed by the Central Bank. This time,

Amigable v Cuenca [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]

Facts:  Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Go