Case Digest for JD 112 (Persons and Family Relations) Cases MIX

Case Digest for JD 112 (Persons and Family Relations)

MANILA ORIENTAL SAWMILL CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR UNION and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS      G.R. No. L-4330 (March 24, 1952)

FACTS:  On May 4, 1950, the United Employees Welfare Association, a union duly registered in the Department of Labor and with members among the employees of the petitioner, entered into an agreement of working conditions with the petitioner pursuant to a settlement concluded in case No. 173-V of the Court of Industrial Relations. The said agreement was to last for one year. On August 14, 1950, thirty-six of the thirty-seven members of the said United Employees Welfare Association tendered their resignations from the same union and joined the local chapter of the respondent National Labor Union. There is no evidence that these resignations were made with the approval of petitioner. On August 15, 1950, the president of the respondent union sent a letter to petitioner containing seven demands allegedly on behalf of the members of its local chapter who are employed by the petitioner, to which the latter, through its counsel, answered with another letter stating among other things that the laborers on whose behalf the letter of August 15, 1950, has been written were already affiliated with the United Employees Welfare Association. On August 22, 1950, the respondent union reiterated its demands. In reply, counsel for petitioner sent a letter stating that petitioner could not recognize the alleged local chapter of the respondent union until and after the agreement of May 4, 1950, entered into by the same employees concerned and petitioner is declared null and void by the Court of Industrial Relations. On August 28, 1950, the members of the respondent union struck. On August 31, 1950, petitioner filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations to declare the strike illegal. On Sept. 8,1950, the court, through its presiding judge, denied the petitioner’s prayer to declare the strike illegal. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Industrial Relations but the said motion was denied.

ISSUE: WON the order of the Court of Industrial Relations is null or void.

RULING: We find merit in this claim. The record shows that the local chapter of the respondent union is composed entirely, except one, of members who made up the total membership of the United Employees Welfare Association, a registered union in the petitioner’s company. To be exact, thirty-six of the thirty-seven members of said association tendered their resignations and joined the local chapter of the respondent union without first securing the approval of their resignations. The new Union then sought to present a seven-point demand of the very same employees to petitioner, which in many respects differs from their previous demand. It is evident that the purpose of their transfer is merely to disregard and circumvent the contract entered into between the same employees and the petitioner on May 4, 1950, knowing full well that that contract was effective for one year, and was entered into with the sanction of the Court of Industrial Relations. If this move were allowed the result would be a subversion of a contract freely entered into without any valid and justifiable reason. Such act cannot be sanctioned in law or in equity as it is in derogation of the principle underlying the freedom of contract and the good faith that should exist in contractual relations. A labor organization is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of settling labor disputes. That is why it is given personality and recognition in concluding collective bargaining agreements. But if it is made use of as a subterfuge, or as a means to subvert valid commitments, it outlives its purpose for far from being an aid, it tends to undermine the harmonious relations between management and labor. Such is the move undertaken by the respondent union. Such a move cannot be considered lawful and cannot receive the sanction of the Court. Hence, the strike it has staged is illegal. WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company , 100 Phil 168

FACTS: Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell and CAL offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.

Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

HELD:  Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:

“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Yutivo & Sons Hardware Co. V CTA, L-13203, Jan 28. 1961

FACTS: Yutivo bought a number of cars and trucks from General Motors Overseas Incorporated (GM) to sell it to the public (buy and sell). GM paid sales tax prescribed in Sections 184, 185, and 186 of tax code based on its selling price to Yutivo. Said tax paid only once on original sale, so Yutivo no longer paid sales tax on its sale to the public (people).

On June 13, 1946, the Southern Motor’s Inc (SM) was organized to sell cars, trucks and spare parts.  It was incorporated and the subscribers (owner shall we say) are sons of the founders of Yutivo.  The cars and trucks purchased by Yutivo from GM were sold to SM which, in turn, sold them to the public. GM withdraw from the Phil in the middle of 1947, US manufacturer’s of GM cars appointed Yutivo as importer for VisMin which continued its arrangement of selling exclusively to SM. (Yutivo,as importer                    SM         Public). Taking GM’s position as importer, it’s now Yutivo who paid sales tax (similar as above), SM paid no sales tax.

Upon investigation, Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) made an assessment and demanded from Yutivo a certain amount (Php2,215,809.27 (taxes previously paid were not deducted)) as deficiency sales tax plus surcharge.  On the ground that the taxable sales were the retail sales by SM and not the sales at whole sale made by Yutivo to SM, in as much as SM and Yutivo were one and the same corporation, the former being the subsidiary of the latter.

Yutivo was alleged that the purpose in the organization of SM is to evade the payment of taxes/defraud the government.

The fact of organization of SM holds below:

•Corporation of SM was organized in June 1946 , when it could not caused Yutivo any tax savings and when it is more than a year before GM withdrew from the Phil (tax evasion device runs counter to the fact that there was no tax to evade)

•Even though an observation from the news clippings said that as early as 1945 it was known that GM would leave in the Phil, one cannot speculate that Yutivo anticipated the withdrawal thus organize SM since newspaper clippings was published on 1947.

•The reported in above news clippings was a rumoured plan and Acting Manager refused to confirm the rumor

The court is inclined to agree with the lower court that SM was actually owned/ controlled by petitioner as to make it its mere subsidiary because of following reasons:

•SM is under the management and control of Yutivo by virtue of a management contract entered into by the two parties

•Cash or funds of SM are place in the custody and control of Yutivo  as evidenced by the latter handling all cash assets and maintaining all cash transactions of the former

• Since SM is under Yutivo’s control, the former’s operations and existence became dependent upon the latter

ISSUE: WON, Yutivo acted in bad faith in its organization of SM.

HELD: No. A taxpayer has the legal right to decrease the amount of tax or even avoid them by means which the law permits. All legal means used by taxpayers to reduce taxes are all right. A person may perform an act that he honestly believe to be sufficient to exempt him from taxes.  He does not incur fraud even if the act is there after found to be insufficient.  There is no fraud, since intention to minimize taxes in the context of fraud must be proved to exist by clear and convincing evidence. Decision of CTA to ordering Yutivo to pay the amount stated above was modified. Respondent is now ordered to pay 820,549.91, plus 25% surcharge for late payment.

SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JAMANDRE INDUSTRIES, INC. and TIRSO JAMANDRE,respondents.

FACTS: SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural machinery, products and equipment.  On September 20, 1966, SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement whereby SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City and Province of Iloilo. The agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis.  In the course of the business relationship arising from the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus interest and attorney’s fees.

JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for damages representing unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System Development Corporation (FSDC) 21units of Mitsubishi power tillers.  In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in 1977 24units of Mitsubishi power tillers to FSDC, which fact JII allegedly made known to SEACOM, but the latter taking advantage of said information and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold 21 units of said tractors with much lower prices, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit of P85,415.61.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held affirmatively; the act of SEACOM in dealing directly with FSDC was unfair and unjust to its agent, and that there was fraud in the transaction between FSDC and SEACOM to the prejudice of JII.  “SEACOM not satisfied with the presence of its dealer JII in the market, joined the competition even as against the latter, and thereby changed the scenario of the competition thereby rendering inutile the dealership agreement which they entered into to the manifest prejudice of JII” On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no agency relationship between the parties but SEACOM is nevertheless liable in damages for having acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer in the sale of the farm machineries to FSDC.  Both courts invoke as basis for the award Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.”

ISSUE:  Whether  SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries to FSDC.

HELD: Yes. Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive basis, SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code above-quoted.  This provision, together with the succeeding article on human relation, was intended to embody certain basic principles “that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order.” What is sought to be written into the law is the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.

SC accordingly resolves to affirm the award for unrealized profits.  The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court failed to specify to which the two appellees the award for moral and exemplary damages is granted. However, in view of the fact that moral damages are not as a general rule granted to a corporation, and that Tirso Jamandre was the one who testified on his feeling very aggrieved and on his mental anguish and sleepless nights thinking of how SEACOM “dealt with us behind (our) backs”, the award should go to defendant Jamandre, President of JII.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of P2,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages shall be paid to defendant Tirso Jamandre.

Costs against appellant.

AGAPITO MAGBANUA, ET AL.,G.R. Nos. L-66870-72, June 29, 1985  VS. HON. IAC (SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISON), ET AL.,FACTS:

-six (6) plaintiffs who are petitioners in the instant case, were all share tenants of the defendants

-they claimed that defendants diverted the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of their landholdings to dry up to their great damage and prejudice.

-that they were told by the defendants’ overseer to vacate their respective areas for they could not plant palay any longer due to lack of water.

-they prayed that be declared as leasehold tenants and that defendants be ordered to pay attorney’s fees and different kind of damages.

- a Joint Decision was rendered by the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations statione din San Carlos City (Negros Occidental)

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT

-declared plaintiffs to be maintained as agricultural leeses, prohibits the defendants form closing/disruptin the free flow of water to plaintiff’s landholdings, granting moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, etc.

-defendants appealed to the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (IAC)

IAC’s ruling

AFFIRMED the DECISION appealed with MODIFICATION by deleting the award of moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees

-plaintiffs filed a petition before the SC praying for the reinstatement of the moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees on the ground that IAC committed grave abuse of discreting in eliminating them.

SC RULING The SC reiterated the findings and basis  of the trial court in coming out with the award for the damages and attorney’s fees as well and mentioned the basis of IAC’s modification of the said decision.

-Under the facts of the case, plaintiffs (now petitioners) are entitled to a measure of moral damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same Code.

-petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiff’s rights and caused prejudice to the latter by the unjustified diversion of water.

-petitioners are entitled to exemplary damages (Art. 2232. CC) as defendants acted in an oppressive manner.

-petitioners are entitled to atty’s fees but the amount of the fees as well as the damages is subject to the sound discretion of the Court.

DISPO: Petition granted. The decision is modified and the defendants are jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiffs  damages and atty’s fees as computed.

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,  vs. ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-17396   May 30, 1962

FACTS: Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.

After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of law.

The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named PeBeco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:

Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.

Reply

Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."

We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur

Hermosisima vs Court of Appeals 103 Phil 629 Breach of Promise to Marry

FACTS:An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.

HELD:  It appearing that because of the defendant-appellant’s seductive prowess, plaintiff-appellee overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control. In the present case, the court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten years younger but also because the CFI found that complainant surrendered herself to the petitioner because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

WASSMER V VELEZ G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.

ISSUE: Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?

RULING: Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

DECISION: Affirmed.

Estopa vs Piansay, jr 1960

Facts: The plaintiff Erlinda Estopa, a beautiful girl of twenty-three, residing in Bago, Negros Occidental, with her widowed mother, Felicidad Estopa, stated that she fell in love and submitted herself completely to the defendant Loreta Piansay, Jr., sometime in September, 1957, after a courtship that lasted for a couple of months during which period the defendant consistently promised and succeeded to make her believe in him that he was going to marry her; that sometime in December, 1957, the plaintiff was informed reliably that defendant was backing out from his promise of marriage so she demanded defendant's compliance to his promise in order to vindicate her honor, and plaintiff went to the extent of asking the help of defendant's parents, but all her efforts were in vain. Finally, realizing that her efforts were futile but knowing that her cause was not completely lost, she decided to file her complaint, not to compel defendant to marry her, but to demand from him a compensation for the damages that she sustained. No other claims of damages was petitioned, she merely alleged "social humiliation, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling and moral shock."

This is an appeal from the decision of the Negros Occidental court of first instance awarding to plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.         

Issue: Whether or not Estopa can claim damages becasue of the breach of promise to marry by Piasay.

Held: No, as plaintiff has no right to moral damages, she may not demand exemplary damages. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. (Art. 2234, New Civil Code)

We have today decided that in this jurisdiction, under the New Civil Code, the mere breach of a promise to marry is not actionable. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, Supra, 631); and we have reversed the Cebu court's award for moral damages in breach of promise suit. Consistently with such ruling, Loreta Piansay, Jr. may not be condemned to pay moral damages, in this case. Therefore, as plaintiff is not entitled to any damages at all, there is no reason to require Piansay, Jr. to satisfy attorney's fees.

Dispo: Judgment reversed, defendant absolved from all liability. No costs.

Galang vs CA Jan 29, 1962

Facts:This is an action against Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximo Quinit to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by plaintiff Beatriz Galang for an alleged breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo Quinit to marry her.

The evidence on other pertinent facts is, however, conflicting. On the side of the plaintiff,  Ms. Galang, she maintains that that Rodrigo courted her in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's mother was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her house and her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, with the exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the marriage celebrated in Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left for Baguio; that upon arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the bus and took them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements for their wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making these arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7, appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a residence certificate, although both prospective contracting parties signed the corresponding application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he going to their hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never returned; that when appellee returned to their hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.

Upon the other hand, the defendants sought to establish that Rodrigo and plaintiff . were engaged; that Rodrigo's parents were opposed to their marriage; that while Rodrigo was agreeable to marrying appellee, he wanted the marriage to take place after his graduation, while appellee was impatient and wanted the marriage to be held at an earlier date; that on April 26, 1955, in view of Rodrigo's continued relations with appellee, his parents told him to leave the parental home, for which reason on that date he left their house with his belongings and some gantas of rice; that before leaving their hometown he passed by the house of appellee and told her what had happened and further told her that he was intending to go to Manila to look for a job; that appellee convinced him to go, instead to Colorado Falls where they could discuss their plans and so there he went - followed later by appellee - both staying at the house of Dagawan; that because Rodrigo persistently refused to marry appellee, the latter's relatives, accompanied by policemen and constabulary soldiers, arrived at the place and tried to intimidate him; that in view of his continued refusal they brought him down to Sison where he was allowed to go home; that thereupon his parents placed him under the custody of Mayor Madriaga of the neighboring town of Rosario where he stayed from May 1, to June, 1955; that sometime during the month of June, Adolfo Dagawan sought Rodrigo on the pretext that he was going to tell him something important and was able to lure him to a secluded place where he was made to sign an application for a marriage license; that because of his non-appearance before a notary public, the latter refused to acknowledge the application.

The court of first instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals considered her evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, reversed said decision insofar as Maximino Quinit is concerned, and modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit, by eliminating the awards for moral damages and attorney's fees.

This is an appeal by certiorari taken by plaintiff Beatriz Galang.

Issue: Whether or not Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximino Quinit are liable for breach of promise against Beatriz Galang.

Held: Plaintiff maintains that the Court of Appeals had erred in the appreciation of the evidence, but the findings of said Court on the credibility of said evidence are beyond our power of review on appeal by certiorari and, consequently, conclusive upon us.

It is next urged that said Court had also erred in not awarding moral damages to plaintiff, who insists that moral damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible under our laws, but this question has already been settled adversely to plaintiff's pretense in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals.

Dispo: The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, without special pronouncement as to cost. It is so ordered

WELLS FARGO BANK & UNION TRUST COMPANY, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent-appellee. G.R. No. L-46720

FACTS:

1)      Birdie Lillian Eye, wife of Clyde Milton Eye, died on September 16, 1932, at Los Angeles, California, the place of her alleged last residence and domicile. Among the properties she left her one-half conjugal share in 70,000 shares of stock in the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with is principal office in the City of Manila.

2)      Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company, was duly appointed trustee of the created by the said will

3)      Respondent Collector of Internal Revenue sought to subject anew the aforesaid shares of stock to the Philippine inheritance tax, to which petitioner-appellant objected.

4)      The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, holding that the transmission by will of the said 35,000 shares of stock is subject to Philippine inheritance tax.

5)      Section 1536 of the Administrative Code, as amended, provides that every transmission by virtue of inheritance of any share issued by any corporation of sociedad anonima organized or constituted in the Philippines, is subject to the tax therein provided. This provision has already been applied to shares of stock in a domestic corporation which were owned by a British subject residing and domiciled in Great Britain. (Knowles vs. Yatco, G. R. No. 42967. See also Gibbs vs. Government of P. I., G. R. No. L-35694.)

6)      The petitioner cited the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court in four cases generally saying: to the effect that an inheritance tax can be imposed with respect to intangibles only by the State where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death, and that, under the due-process clause, the State in which a corporation has been incorporated has no power to impose such tax if the shares of stock in such corporation are owned by a non-resident decedent.

ISSUE:

A.)   Whether or not the transfer of the aforesaid shares of stock is legally subject to the Philippine inheritance tax?

B.)   It is contended, by the defendant, that their situs is in the domicile of the owner thereof, and, therefore, their transmission by death necessarily takes place under his domiciliary laws.

Supreme Court Held:

1)      The question here involved is essentially not one of due-process, but of the power of the Philippine Government to tax.

2)      Basis of ruling:

a.      1) upon the recognition of the inherent power of each government to tax persons, properties and rights within its jurisdiction and enjoying, thus, the protection of its laws; and (2) upon the principle that as o intangibles, a single location in space is hardly possible, considering the multiple, distinct relationships which may be entered into with respect thereto.

b.      In the case of Burnet vs. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378; 77 Law. ed. 844 in the United States, the court ruled:

“As jurisdiction may exist in more than one government, that is, jurisdiction based on distinct grounds – the citizenship of the owner, his domicile, the source of income, the situs of the property – efforts have been made to preclude multiple taxation through the negotiation of appropriate international conventions. These endeavors, however, have proceeded upon express or implied recognition, and not in denial, of the sovereign taxing power as exerted by governments in the exercise of jurisdiction upon any one of these grounds”

c.       When the taxpayer extends his activities with respect to his intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protection and benefit of the laws of another state, in such a way as to bring his person or properly within the reach of the tax gatherer there, the reason for a single place of taxation no longer obtains; there is constitutional power of each state concerned to tax.

3)      In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled therein. And besides, the certificates of stock have remained in this country up to the time when the deceased died in California, and they were in possession of one Syrena McKee, secretary of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The owner residing in California has extended here her activities with respect to her intangibles so as to avail herself of the protection and benefit of the Philippine laws. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Philippine Government to tax must be upheld

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant. G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927

FACTS:

1)      The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

2)      The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

3)       The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code:

a.      “Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated”

4)      But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws. It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. Therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed

5)      The exclusion of the appellant as a legatee is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

“…it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.”

ISSUE:

A)     Whether or not the approval of the said scheme of partition was valid or not?

B)     Whether or not the denial of his participation in the inheritance is legal or not?

C)     Whether or not the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this case?

The Supreme Court Held:

1)      The approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous

a.      “…inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)”

b.      The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular case.

2)      the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law, as stated in article 792 of the Civil Code.

a.      The said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

3)      Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects.

ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. G.R. No. L-35694

FACTS:

1)      This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, requiring the register of deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to present any document showing that the succession tax due under Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.

2)      The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by said certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto, California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her husband were citizens of the State of California and domiciled therein.

3)      Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part that:

Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document transferring real property or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding provincial treasurer of the non payment of the tax discovered by them…

4)      Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree of court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.

5)      December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds “to issue the corresponding titles” to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax.

6)      After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of September 22, 1930, and entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.

7)      The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code

a.      Article 9 of the Civil Code:

“The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.”  -- It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the law of California.

b.      Article 10 of the Civil Code:

“Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.”

8)      The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of title in favor of Allison Gibbs from the conjugal ownership with Eva Gibbs, his wife, be subject to succession or inheritance tax by the government of the Philippines?

Supreme Court HELD:

1)      Upon the death of the wife, under California law, the husband is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon her death.

a.      Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419):

“The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are uniform to the effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death of the wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though required by himself. … It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife.”

2)      Following the Californian law, there was no inheritance. So the property in question will now be a real property instead of personal property.

a.      Article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.

b.      It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478 (United States jurisprudence):

In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the property is situated.

c.       The nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae.

d.      The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances.

3)      The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with directions to dismiss the petition.

Insular Government v Frank

FACTS:An appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Manila dated 05 September 1905.

OOA 17 Apr 1903, in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois, USA, the defendant an through a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for two (2) years and to receive a salary $ 1,200 a year as a stenographer.

The contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the defendant, he becomes liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government. On 11 February 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.

ISSUES: WON the law of the Philippines or that of the State of Illinois would govern to the case at bar.

RULING: Contract was entered into in Illinois by a minor in the Philippines but had the capacity in Illinois.

No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation, and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made.

DISPO: Affirmed

Germann & Co v Donaldson

FACTS: This is an incident of want of personality of the plaintiff’s attorney. The action is to recover money said to be due for freight under charter party. It was brought by virtue of general power of suits, executed in Manila by Fernando Kammerzell, and purports to be a substitution in favor of several attorneys of power given to Kammerzell in an instrument executed in Berlin by Max Leonard Tornow, the sole owner of the business carried on in Berlin and Manila under the name Germann & Co.

ISSUES: WON the power of attorney executed in Germany is valid.

RULING: Held that a power of attorney executed in Germany, should be tested as to its formal validity by the laws of that country and not by the provisions of the CC.

DISPO: Affirmed

MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ, plaintiff-appellee,  vs. AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, defendant-appellant.  AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET AL., intervenors-appellees.

Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City of Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8 and 6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain properties to be put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928, where he has since remained. On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the forms of marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three children as a result of that marriage. Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.

Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of the State of Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows:

The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year thereafter.

The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the spouse who, having legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to the guardian appointed by the court, within said period of one year, the equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property.

be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from the respective estates had their parents did intestate on November 28, 1927. It is also prayed that the community existing between plaintiff and defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be ordered to render an accounting and to deliver to the plaintiff her share of the community property, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff alimony at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as counsel fees, the sum of five thousand pesos (P5000), and that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the expenses incurred in educating the three minor sons.

A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor children, and they appear as intervenors and join their mother in these proceedings. The Court of First Instance, after hearing, found against the defendant and granted judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff and intervenors, with the exception of reducing attorneys fees to three thousand, and also granted costs of the action against the defendant. From this judgment defendant appeals and makes the following assignment of errors:

I. The lower court erred in not declaring that paragraph 2 of section 9 of the Philippine Divorce Law, is unconstitutional, null and void.

II. The lower court erred in holding that section 9 of Act No. 2710 (Divorce Law) applies to the Nevada decree of divorce issued in favor of appellant Augusto C. Gonzalez, said decree being entitled to confirmation and recognition.

III. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in intervention for lack of cause of action against appellant and appellee.

IV. The lower court erred in not declaring the notice of lis pendens filed by intervenors to be null and void.

V. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 per month for the support not only of his children but also of his ex-wife, appellee herein, Manuela Barretto.

VI. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff- appellee, Manuela Barretto, is not entitled to support from her ex-husband, herein appellant, over and beyond the alimony fixed by the divorce decree in Exhibit A.

VII. The lower court erred in condemning defendant appellant to pay to plaintiff-appellee P3,000 attorney's fees.

VIII. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial.

While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On the record here presented this can not be done. The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710, and the decisions of this court: Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252); Garcia Valdez vs. Soteraña Tuason (40 Phil., 943-952); Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855); Chereau vs. Fuentebella (43 Phil., 216); Fernandez vs. De Castro (48 Phil., 123); Gorayeb vs. Hashim (50 Phil., 22); Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42); Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian Ng Shun and Lim Tingco (52 Phil., 571); and the late case of Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, decided March 21, 1931, and reported in 55 Phil., 851.

The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:

The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.

And article 11, the last part of which reads:

. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.

It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. The lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief. The hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what he personal views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.

Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals. Holding the above views it becomes unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional question presented by appellant in his first assignment of error.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be reversed and defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this action. This, however, without prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and the intervenors may have against defendant. No special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

MARGARET QUERUBIN VS SILVESTRE QUERUBIN

Facts:   Silvestre Querubin was born in Ilocos Sur. In 1926 he moved to United States to study. He earned his Masters in Art and Sciences in University of Southern California. On October 20, 1943 Silvestre married Margaret in New Mexico. As a result of their marriage was born Querubina. Margaret filed divorce against the defendant in 1948. The husband filed a counterclaim for the infidelity of his wife. The divorce was granted on February 7, 1948. At the time of trial custody the wife was denied with the care of the child because she was then living with another man. In an interlocutory decree ordered by Los Angeles court, the child, who was 3 ½ years old, was granted to husband. But the child should be kept in a neutral home; both parties were given reasonable visitation and both were restrained from removing the child out of the state. November 1949, Silvestre left US and took the child with him to the Philippines. He declared that he had brought his daughter to the Philippines because he wanted her daughter to be raised in environment of high moral and that not be punish indirectly with the  wife’s infidelity. Margaret through his lawyer request for the custody in Court of First Instance in Ilocos Sur of her daughter, alleging as basis the interlocutory decree of the California court that gave her such custody. Silvestre, even he lived abroad, has not changed his citizenship.

Issue: If  the interlocutory decree ordered in California court be in force in Philippines?

Ruling: Because the interlocutory decree is not a final decision, it cannot be asked for their fulfillment in the Philippines. Before such a judgment rendered in one state is entitled to acceptance, in courts of another state, as conclusive merits, it must be a final judgment and not merely an interlocutory decree.   Under the divorce law the spouse who was declared guilty of marital infidelity is not entitled to the custody of minor children. For the welfare of the child Querubina, which is what matters most in this case, the custody of the father should be considered preferential. The judgment of foreign courts cannot be in force in the Philippines if they are contrary to laws, customs and public order. The ruling is upheld on appeal. The appellant pay the costs.

Ang vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc. Jan. 27, 1967

Facts: Yau Yue Commercial Bank Ltd. Of Hongkong agreed to sell 140 packages of galvanized steel durzinc sheets to Herminio G. Teves for the sum of $32, 458.26US. terms of goods are as follows:

Purchase price should be covered by bank draft payable by Herminio in exchange of the bill of lading deposited at Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Manila.

Upon arrival of the articles, Teves is to be notified and would pay the amount of goods in exchange of the delivery of the bill of lading.

Teves would present the bill of lading to carrier’s agent which is the American Steamship for the issuance of permit to deliver to be presented to Bureau of Customs for the release of goods.

Shipment of articles was on April 30, 1961 and arrival of goods was on May  9, 1961. Teves did not pay the draft, the bank likewise return the bill of lading to Yau Yue which Yau Yue indorsed to Domingo Ang. Yet, Teves was able to obtain a bank guaranty in favor of steamship that he would surrender the original and negotiable bill of lading and thus succeeded in getting a permit to deliver and Bureau of Customs  released the articles.

Upon claiming the goods by Ang, he was informed that it was already released to Teves.

On Dec. 2, 1963, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground of plaintiff’s cause of action under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Commonwealth Act. No. 65) Sec. 3 par. 4. That action is to be filed within 1 year of the delivery.
Lower court dismissed the action on the ground of prescription.

Issue: WON, there was loss of goods subject to matter of complaint. WON, there was rightful delivery or misdelivery.

Held: Goods cannot be deemed lost because there was fact of delivery of the merchandise. No loss was defined also on the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

CC, Art. 18 states that, In matters which governed by Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this code.

DISMISSAL is reversed, and set aside, this remanded to a qou for further court proceedings.

Ramos vs. Hijos I. de la Rama Mar. 21, 1910

Facts: On Jul. 23, 1907, Rafael Ramos alleged Martin Grosin (sheriff) and Martin Lopez of The Sons of I. de la Rama proceeded on the attached 20 carabaos, 10 castrated, 7 females, and 3males. Manuel Lopez was declared default yet the sons of I. de la Rama denied all allegations. Ownership of Ramos are all based on an alleged public document of transfer executed by Inventor in favor of Ramos last Sept. 14, 1906 and is said to be a sham and contrary to law and made with the intent to defraud the firm, the creditor of Inventor.

On Jan. 24, 1908 the case was heard and on May 8, 1908 the court declared the instrument null & void.

Issue: WON, the sale of the carabaos to Ramos is valid.

Held: Defendants should be acquitted of complaints, with cost to the appellant.

Act. No. 1147, sec. 3 states that Municipal treasurers should enter in a book all transfer of large cattles.

Sec. 22 also states that no transfer shall be valid unless registered and a certificate of transfer shall be provided. Said special law was violated in this case by the appellant.

Art. 14 of CC states that, Acts executed against the provisions of law are void, excepting the cases in which said law orders its validity.

Art. 18 of CC also states that, In matters which are governed by this code of commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this code.

Rafael Enriquez vs. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada November 29, 1920

Fact:  This is an appeal from the ruling of the Court of First Instance, Manila.On September 24, 1917 Joaquin Ma. Herrer applied for life insurance with theSun Life Assurance Company of Canada and the corresponding premium of Php 6,000. Subject to medical examination and subject to the approval andacceptance of the Head office of the insurance company in Canada(Montreal).On November 26, 1917 the head office cabled its acceptance and issued apolicy dated December 4, 1918 at Montreal.A letter of acceptance was send to Joaquin on November 26, 1917 by theManila office, which was received by Joaquin’s lawyer on December 21,1917. Joaquin died on December 20, 1917.

Issue:  WON, there was a contract of insurance.

Ruling: There was no contract of insurance. Civil code provision that the acceptance must come to the knowledge of theofferor.

RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, as administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. Herrer, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, defendant-appellee.
vs. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS: On September 24, 1917, Joaquin Herrer made application to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity. Two days later he paid the sum of P6,000 to the manager of the company’s Manila office and was given a receipt.

 The application was immediately forwarded to the head office of the company at Montreal, Canada. On November 26, 1917, the head office gave notice of acceptance by cable to Manila. On December 4, 1917, the policy was issued at Montreal. On December 18, 1917, attorney Aurelio A. Torres wrote to the Manila office of the company stating that Herrer desired to withdraw his application. The following day the local office replied to Mr. Torres, stating that the policy had been issued, and called attention to the notification of November 26, 1917. This letter was received by Mr. Torres on the morning of December 21, 1917. Mr. Herrer died on December 20, 1917.

The letter of November 26, 1917, notifying Mr. Herrer that his application had been accepted, was prepared and signed in the local office of the insurance company, was placed in the ordinary channels for transmission, but as far as we know, was never actually mailed and thus was never received by the applicant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract for life annuity of Mr Herrer was perfected.

RULING: The Civil Code rule, that an acceptance made by letter shall bind the person making the offer only from the date it came to his knowledge. The courts who take this view have expressly held that an acceptance of an offer of insurance not actually or constructively communicated to the proposer does not make a contract.

SC holds that the contract for a life annuity in the case at bar was not perfected because it has not been proved satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application ever came to the knowledge of the applicant.

Judgment is reversed, and the plaintiff shall have and recover from the defendant the sum of P6,000 with legal interest from November 20, 1918, until paid, without special finding as to costs in either instance. So ordered.

LICHAUCO & COMPANY., petitioner, Vs. SILVERIO APOSTOL, as Director of Agriculture, and RAFAEL CORPUS, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, respondents

Facts Lichauco & Co. petitioned for the writs of mandamus and injunction against Silverio Apostol and Rafael Corpus allegedly refusing Lichauco & Co to import from Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum except upon the condition, stated in AO No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture contending that said cattle shall have been immunized from the rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn.

The petitioner asseted that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the Administrative Code (amended by Act no. 3052), the petitioner has “an absolute and unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum from phom-pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippin Islands” and that the respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner previous said restrictions.

Respondents relied upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and AO no. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture in relation with Dept. Order No. 6

Issue Whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum?

Held Section 1762 is for the general rule, while section 1770 is for particular contingency and not inconsistent with Section 1762.

Petition does not show sufficient ground for granting the writs of mandamus and injunction.

Dispo We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the reason that section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature, while section 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762. Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a special qualification of section 1762. Of course the two provisions are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as amended, is considered alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring in can be imported without restriction, while if section 1770 is still in force the cattle, under the conditions stated in the petition, can be brought in only upon compliance with the requirements of Administrative Order No. 21. But this difference between the practical effect of the two provisions does not make then inconsistent in the sense that the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the amendatory Act (3052).

That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two provisions. Thus, we find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into the Island at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some defined foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. Section 1770 is the backbone of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the special emergency therein contemplated; and if that section should be obliterated, the administrative authorities here would be powerless to protect the agricultural industry of the Islands from the spread of animal infection originating abroad.

Catindig vs CA G.R. No. L-33063       Feb. 28, 1979

Facts: CatalinoCatindig is a petitioner-plaintiff in a civil case which sought to compel defendantsto surrender their certificate of title No. 13725 of the Register of Deeds of Laguna and to acknowledge the contract of sale executed by them in favor of the petitioner. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered a decision dated September 29, 1969 which, among others, dismissed the complaint and ordered the document titled "KasulatanngPagbibilihangTuluyanngBahagingLupaingTubigan" to be reformed to that of equitable mortgage redeemable by defendants-private respondents within a period of 10 years from July 18, 1958 for the same amount of the equitable mortgage.A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner on November 11, 1969 which was, however, denied by the trial court for lack of merit.

Thereafter, a notice of appeal and an appeal bond were filed on December 18, 1969 by the petitioner  which were approved by the trial court. The appeal having been perfected, the Clerk of Court of the trial court forwarded all the records to respondent Court of Appeals.

In the meanwhile, a notice to file a printed record on appeal dated May 25, 1970 was sent by the Court of Appeals to petitioners' former counsels, Attys. Bonifacio and Padua who received such notice on June 3, 1970. Atty. Arsenio Velasquez failed to comply with the directive of the respondent Court of Appeals to file a printed record on appeal within the reglementary period stated in said notice because he never received a copy of such notice. Neither did Attys. Bonifacio and Padua comply with the notice to file a printed record on appeal because of their honest belief that they were relieved of such responsibility, having previously withdrawn their appearance as co for petitioners. On May 20, 1970, petitioners paid the docket fee. The deadline for submitting the printed record on appeal was August 2, 1970.

Respondent Court of Appeals issued a resolution dated August 18, 1970 dismissing the appeal of petitioner for failure to file printed record on appeal within the period prescribed in the Notice of May 26, 1970.

On August 11, 1970, Atty. Velasquez found out that a notice to file a printed record on appeal was sent to Attys. Bonifacio and Padua. He then caused the hurried printing of the record on appeal and filed the same with respondent Court of Appeals on August 18, 1970 accompanied by a manifestation explaining the unfortunate circumstances that caused the failure of the petitioners to comply with the notice to file a printed record on appeal.

Subsequently, a motion to reconsider the order of dismissal was filed by petitioner on September 23, 1970 which was denied by the respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated October 5, 1970. Again, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration of resolution dated August 18, 1970 which was also denied in a resolution issued by respondent Court of Appeals on December 29, 1970.

Issue: whether respondent Court of Appeals acted correctly in dismissing the appeal of petitioner for failure to file the printed record on appeal within the reglementary period.

Ruling:We hold that petitioners' appeal should be reinstated in consonance with the dictates of justice and fair play. The failure to timely file the printed mimeographed copies of the record on appeal for the convenience of the member of the appellate courts may be excused for justifiable reasons.Hence, the petition at bar which the Court finds to be meritorious and therefore grants on the strength of controlling jurisprudence that such failure to timely file the printed copies of the appeal for the convenience of the member of the appellate courts may be excused for justifiable reasons since the appellate court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal but the said discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance to the tenets of justice and fairly play, having in mind the circumstance obtaining in each case.

In the case at bar, when Atty. Velasquez, found out on August 11, 1970 that a notice submit and file a printed record on appeal was sent to the petitioners' former counsels, he lost no time in causing the printing and filing of the same, and on May 20, 1970, herein petitioner paid voluntarily the Appellate Court docket fee. These facts strongly reveal that petitioner never intended to abandon their appeal as to warrant its dismissal. An appeal may be reinstated, even after the remand of the record to the trial court, where it appears that the dismissal of the appeal was made under the erroneous impression that the appellants had abandoned their appeal.

Excusable imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure or lapses in the literal or rigid observation of a procedural rule or non-jurisdictional deadline provided therein should be overlooked and brushed aside as trivial and indecisive in the interest of fair play and justice when public policy is not involved. The cardinal rule remains that the discretionary power to dismiss appeals or not must always be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, respondent appellate court's resolutions dismissing petitioners' appeal are set aside and the case is remanded to it for further proceedings and disposition of the appeal on its merits, No pronouncement as to costs.

GLOBE MACKAY VS TOBIAS  G.R. No. 81262     176 SCRA 778 AUGUST 25, 1989        

FACTS: In year 1972 GlobeMackay discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Herbert C. Hendry who was the Executive President alleged Mr. Restituto M. Torbias as a number one suspect of the said anomalies since, the latter actually made the report regarding the hot issues in the company. And the petitioner filed 5cases against the respondent which 4 of those were estafathrough falsification of commercial documents and 5th was for violation Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence) but all these cases were dismissed by the Judge of RTC for lack supporting evidence. The defendant file a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive act of the petitioner and fortunately the judge decided in favour of the private respondents for payable charges. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to CA and on the other hand Torbias appeal as to the amount of damages. However, in decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioner questioned the award of moral damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is subject to exemplary damages as subject to him by the private respondents.

HELD: Under Art. 21 Any person causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public shall compensate the latter for damages. Wherefore, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA in CA-GR CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

HILARIA SIKAT VS  JOHN CANSON

FACTS:  On February 15, 1904, Hilaria Sikat a Filipina contracted marriage with John Canson , an Italian citizen in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan. It was till 1911, when the wife filed divorce which was later dismissed by court without passing merits thereof.  February 27, 1922 John Canson became a naturalized Filipino citizen. In 1928, he went to Reno, Nevada USA and on October 8 of that year, he obtained an absolute decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. Hilaria Sikat remained in the Philippines. On 1933 Hilaria filed a case in Court of First Instance in Rizal wherein she sought to compel the defendant to pay her a monthly pension as support. To this complaint CAnson interposed three defenses: (1) adultery of the plaintiff (2) absolute divorce obtained by the defendant in Nevada (3) that the defendant did not have means to pay the allowance sought. The court dismissed the complaint in a decision rendered on November 27, 1933. In this decision the court declined to accord the validity to divorce obtained in Reno but found Hilaria Sikat had forfeited her right to support because she committed adultery. This judgment was not appealed and became final.  To obtain the liquidation of conjugal partship, Hilaria Sikat instituted another action on June 1, 1934, contented to court that the decree of divorce issued to Canson should be recognized by Philippine court, since 12 days prior to the issuance of divorce, defendant became a naturalized American citizen and argues that the Nevada court had thereby acquired jurisdiction over him to issue a divorce decree.

Issue: Whether or not the decree of divorce issued by Nevada court valid?

Ruling:  No, it is invalid. It is not the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon court, but his legal residence within the state. And assuming that John Canson acquired legal residence in Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers, this did not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant a divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction nor the jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines.

Affirmed.

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. vs. JAMES J. RAFFERTY, as COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. 14205

Fact Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila on Dec. 20, 1916 to recover the sum of P83,159.63 said to be illegally assessed and collected by the defendant from the former as internal-revenue tax. Plaintiff alleged that it had been collected and paid under protest by the same(plaintiff) the mentioned amount even when it (plaintiff) was relieved from such internal-revenue taxes by virtue of its charter, subsection 12 of section 1 in relation with subsection 10 of Act No. 1510 stating:

“t was relieved from all taxes of every name and nature-municipal, provincial or central- upon its capital stock, franchise, right of way, earnings, or other property owned or operated by it, except those mentioned in said charter (Act no. 1510).”

Defendant admitted that the amount collected was collected as internal-revenue tax upon certain oil and coal which the plaintiff has imported into the Philippine Islands, for its use. That the collection of such was for the pursuance of the passed Act of the US congress entitled “An Act to reduce tariff duties and to provide revenues for the Government, and for other purposes.”

Issue: May a special law or charter be amended, altered or repealed by a general law by implication?

Held  1. That Act No. 1510 has not been amended, altered, or repealed by any Act of Congress;  2. That the plaintiff was relieved by Act No. 1510 from the payment of the internal-revenue tax collected by the defendant in the present case;  3. The amount in question was, therefore, illegally collected; and 4. That the taxes in question were paid under protest. Therefore, and for the reason given, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Dispo: While the Acts of Congress referred to above contain a provision that all laws inconsistent with their provisions are repealed, yet they expressly provide that they shall not affect any accrued right. The plaintiff had enjoyed the rights granted under Act No. 1510 for a number of years. Such rights were accrued rights. An examination of said Acts of Congress not only fails to disclose any express intention to amend, alter, or repeal Act No. 1510, or any of its provisions, but upon the contrary, we find that the said Acts of Congress expressly protect all rights theretofore accrued.

References: Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general – the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. [U.S.], 425.)

In re: Emil Jurado

In 1995, the Supreme Court, in the case of In re Emil Jurado (243 SCRA 344) pointed out that R.A.No. 53 as amended, is quite unequivocal that the right of refusal to disclose sources is “without prejudice to x xx liability under civil and criminal laws.” R.A. 53 thus confers no immunity from prosecution for libel or for other sanction under the law. xxx All it does is give the journalist the right to refuse (or not to be compelled) to reveal the source of any news report published by him which was revealed to him in confidence^.11

Held:  The rule is that, when called to account for publications denounced as inaccurate and misleading, the journalist has the option (a) to demonstrate their truthfulness or accuracy even if in the process he discloses his sources, or (b) to refuse, on the ground that to do so would require such disclosure. In the latter event, however, he must be ready to accept the consequences of publishing untruthful or misleading stories. 12 Mr.Jurado, a journalist and a member of the Philippine Bar, was accused of “printing stories that are untrue and derogatory of the courts”. He chose the second option (refused to disclosed the source of his information) and was held guilty of contempt of court under Sec. 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and sentenced to pay one thousand pesos (P1,000).

           As of 2001, the Jurado case remains the latest on the subject, for we did not find any case dealing with it..

G.R. No. L-18805 August 14, 1967 

THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS

1 representing THE GOVERNMENT OF THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,vs.

HEIRS OF MAXIMO M. KALAW,

2 JUAN BOCAR, ESTATE OF THE DECEASEDCASIMIRO GARCIA,

3 and LEONOR MOLL, defendants-appellees.

SANCHEZ,  J.:

 The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO, for short) was chartered as a non-profit governmental organization avowedly for the protection, preservation and developmentof the coconut industry in the Philippines. General manager and board chairman was Maximo M. Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were members of the Board; defendant Leonor Moll became director only on December 22, 1947. An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from fulfilling some contracts entered. Nature supervened. Four devastating typhoons visited the Philippines: the first in October, the second and third in November, and the fourth in December, 1947.Coconut trees throughout the country suffered extensive damage. Copra production decreased. Prices spiralled. Warehouses were destroyed. Cash requirements doubled. Deprivation of export facilities increased the time necessary to accumulate shiploads of copra. Quick turnovers became impossible, financing a problem. The buyers threatened damage suits. All the settlements sum up to P1,343,274.52.NACOCO, represented by the Board of Liquidators, seeks to recover the above sum of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw with negligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code (now Article 2176, new Civil Code);and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or breach of trust for having approved the contracts without prior approval of the Board. The lower court came out with a judgment dismissing the complaint. Hence, plaintiff appealed direct to this Court. Plaintiff levelled a major attack on the lower court's holding  that Kalaw justifiedly entered into the controverted contracts without the prior approval of the corporation's directorate. Plaintiff leans heavily on NACOCO's corporate by-laws. Article IV (b), Chapter III thereof, recites, as amongst the duties of the general manager,the obligation: "(b) To perform or execute on behalf of the Corporation upon prior approval of the Board, all contracts necessary and essential to the proper accomplishment for which the Corporation was organized.´ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondent as General Manager without prior approval of the Board are valid corporate acts

HELD: Not of de minimisimportance in a proper approach to the problem at hand, is the nature of a general manager's position in the corporate structure. A rule that has gained acceptance through the years is that a corporate officer "intrusted with the general management and control of its business, has implied authority to make any contract or do any other act which is necessary or appropriate to the conduct of the ordinarybusiness of the corporation. As such officer, "he may, without any special authority fromthe Board of Directors perform all acts of an ordinary nature, which by usage or necessity are incident to his office, and may bind the corporation by contracts in mattersarising in the usual course of business.Settled jurisprudence has it that where similar acts have been approved by the directorsas a matter of general practice, custom, and policy, the general manager may bind thecompany without formal authorization of the board of directors. In varying language,existence of such authority is established, by proof of the course of business, theusageand practicesof the company and by theknowledgewhich the board of directors has, or must bepresumed to have, of acts and doings of its subordinates in and about theaffairs of the corporation.In the case at bar, the practice of the corporation has been to allow its general manager to negotiate and execute contracts in its copra trading activities for and in NACOCO'sbehalf without prior board approval. If the by-laws were to be literally followed, the boardshould give its stamp of prior approval on all corporate contracts. But that board itself,by its acts and through acquiescence, practically laid aside the by-law requirement of prior approval.Under the given circumstances, the Kalaw contracts are valid corporate acts.

Viewed in the light of the entire record, the judgment under review must be, as it ishereby, affirmed

AHS/PHILIPPINE EMPLOYEES UNION VS.NLRCG.R. NO.73721 MARHCH 30, 1987FERNAN, J.

FACTS 1.Petitioner AHS/Philippines Employees Union [FFW] was the recognized collectivebargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of private respondentAHS/Philippines Inc., a company engaged in the sale of hospital and laboratoryequipment and Berna and Pharmaton products.

2.A collective bargaining agreement [CBA] was concluded between the parties for theperiod commencing December 1, 1981 to November 30, 1984.

3.Private respondent company claim that as early as October 1983, its operations had been seriously affected by the suspension of trade and foreign credit facilities, which situation grew worse in early 1984 when its suppliers of Berna and Pharmaton products insisted on a cash LIC basis or M guarantee by the mother company.

4.As respondent company could not comply with these requirements, it decided to strengthen its other division, the HML Division, which sold hospital and laboratory equipment bought from the parent company.

5.It posted a job-opening notice for 7 to 10 medical representatives and one field supervisor for the HML Division. Amelita. Calderon, a member of petitioner union applied for the position of medical representative, but was rejected for lack of the necessary educational attainment and unwillingness to accept provincial assignments.

6.When the economic crisis continued until mid-year of 1984, respondent company decided to change its marketing strategy for the Berna and Pharmaton products to ensure the whole company's viability. Instead of ethical selling through the field representatives, it was decided to shift to the over-the counter [OTC] method and to appoint Zuellig Pharma as national distributor.

7.As this move would result in the abolition of the Pharmaceutical Division, the union president was advised on July 26, 1984 of the impending dissolution of said division and was asked to suggest ways and means by which the termination could be effected in the smoothest manner possible and with least pain.

8.On August 1, 1984, the union president categorically stated to the company president that the union would oppose any termination at all costs, respondent company decided to proceed with the announcement of the termination by serving notice on the same day to the 31 employees of the Pharmaceutical Division, said termination to take effect immediately upon service thereof.

9.In lieu of the 3O day notice required by law, the employees were paid one month'ssalary. Fifteen accepted their termination.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent company validly terminated its employees.

HELD: NO.Under the New Labor Code, even if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article284, the one-month written notice to both the affected employee and the Minister of Laborisrequired, on top of the separation pay. Hence, unlike in the old termination pay laws,payment of a month's salary cannot be considered substantial compliance with theprovisions of Art. 284 of the Labor Code. Since the dismissal of the 31 employees of thePharmaceutical Division of respondent company was effected in violation of the above-citedprovision, the same is illegal.Needless to say, in the absence of a showing that the illegal dismissal was dictated by anti-union motives, the same does not constitute an unfair labor practice as would be a validground for a strike. The remedy is an action for reinstatement with backwagesanddamages. Nevertheless, we take this actuation of respondent company as evidence of the abusive and Oppressive manner by which the retrenchment was effected. And while thelack of proper notice could not be a ground for a strike, this does not mean that the strike

staged by petitioner union was illegal because it was likewise grounded on a violation by respondent company of the CBA, enumerated as an unfair labor Practice under Art. 249 [i]of the Labor code

Art.27 Ledesma, petitioner vs. C.A, respondents

FACTS; VioletaDelmo  a treasurer of Student Leadership Club (an organization) at West Visayas College scheduled to graduate with  magna cum laude was deprived of of the distinction because of her act of lending  money to members of an organization, purportedly in violation of existing school rules and regulations, according to the president of the state college.

 Despite the intervention ofthe office of the Bureau of Public Schools who instructed the President of the  State College  not to deprive  her of the honors. But just as the same, she was made to graduate  as a plain student.

ISSUE; Is the State College President, being a public servant, be deemed liable for damages for failure to perform his duties

HELD; Yes, the defendant being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his personal capacity.

Art.28 Philip S. Uy, petitioner vs. C.A,respondents

FACTS; Petitioner, the exclusive distributor of the House of Mayfair wallcovering products in the Philippines, cried foul  when his former dealer of the same goods, herein private respondent, purchased the merchandise from the House of Mayfair in England thru FNF Trading in West Germany and sold said merchandise in the  Philippines. Both the court of origin a the appellate court rejected petitioner’s thesis that private respondent was engaged in a  sinister form of unfair competition within the context of Art.  28 of the civil code.

 In the suit of injunction which petitioner filed before the RTC of the National Capital Region stationed in Manila, petitioner pressed the  idea that he was practically by-passed and, that private respondent acted in concert with the FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into believing that the goods ordered by the trading firm were intended  for shipment to Nigeria although they were actually shipped to and sold in the Philippines. Private respondent  professed ignorance of the exclusive contract in favor of petitioner and asserted that petitioner’s understanding with Mayfair is binding only between the parties thereto.

ISSUE; Whether or not respondent appellate court  correctly agree with the lower court in disallowing the writ solicited by herein petitioner.

HELD; The right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights whish a party way protects and which may otherwise not be diminished,  nay, rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or interpreting a person or  firm to obtain goods from  the supplier to defeat the very purpose for which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole authorized distributor.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated Jan.13,1989 CA-G.R. SP No.16019 and the order dated Oct.16,1988 issued by the magistrate at the court of origin are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Batarra vs Marcos

Facts:  Fausta Batara filed a complaint to recover damages in an amount of 500php from Francisco Marcos for breach of contract of marriage. Marcos was said to induce Batarra of carnal connection with him with a promise of marriage. Marcos however, claimed that he is not liable for breach of contract with damages resulting from seduction as Batarra is of legal age. She is of already 23 years of age which is a disqualification of the crime of seduction defined in article 443 of the penal code. Though Ramos was in fact guilty of having criminal intercourse, in any event it was an immoral act of both parties by the provisions art 1306, if such a case exist no recovery by one  may be taken against the other. 

Issue: WON Marcos is liable for breach of contract for marriage and damages resulting from his deduction

Held: “ A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so  done.” As Marcos and Batara caused grievance to each other, the court ruled that the defendant be acquitted of the complaint and no costs will be allowed to either party.

ANGELA C. GARCIA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOAQUIN DEL ROSARIO, defendant-appellant January 14, 1916 G.R. No. L-7798

Facts: The purpose of this action was to recover damages from the defendant, as the result of a breach of promise of marriage. The complaint sets up three causes of action.

For the first cause of action the plaintiff alleges that upon the 30th day of June, 1910, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a mutual agreement to join in holy matrimony; carry out said mutual contract, without any legal reason whatever, as a result of which the plaintiff has suffered damages in the sum of P5,000.

As a second cause of action the plaintiff alleged that by reason of said promise to marry and after said contract had been mutually entered into, the defendant had had illicit relations with her, to which she consented and had become pregnant; prayed that the court should award her damages in the sum of P25, to be paid monthly, for the maintenance and education of the child, together with the sum of P50, as medical fees.

For a third cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that at the time of said mutual promise to marry, the plaintiff was employed as a teacher in the public school of the municipality of Calapan, and was receiving as such teacher, the sum of P30 per month; that by reason of the acts of the defendant and by reason of his failure to comply with his promise to marry and by reason of her pregnancy, caused by the defendant as above described, she was obliged to give up her position as such teacher, and prayed for damages in the sum of P30, to be paid monthly, or the sum total of P2,000.

To the foregoing complaint the defendant presented a demurrer, which was overruled by the court, whereupon the defendant presented an answer, in which he interposed a general and special defense. The general defense was a general denial. In his special defense he alleged that on said 30th day of June, 1910, the day on which said contract to marry was mutually entered into, the plaintiff was 25 years 8 months and 28 days of age, and prayed that he be absolved from all liability under the complaint. At the beginning of the trial, the plaintiff waived her right to recover any damages from the defendant based upon the first and second cause of action.

After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Mariano Cui, judge, reached the condition that conclusion that the defendant had damaged the plaintiff in the sum of P540, and rendered a judgment for that amount, together with costs.

ISSUE: WON

1.    The lower court committed an error in overruling the demurer presented.

2.    The lower court committed an error in finding that, by reason of the fact that the defendant had not complied with his promise to marry the plaintiff, she had been prejudiced in her employment.

HELD: No. In not carrying out the promise of marriage the defendant made to the plaintiff, caused her damages in her employment as teacher, whereby she received a salary of P30 a month, by making her resign there from, as she did. On account of this action of the defendant, indemnity for damages can be recovered from him, for through his fault in failing to carry out his promise of marriage plaintiff lost her position as teacher.

In order equitably to adjust said indemnity, in the opinion of the court, it is necessary to take into account, not only the monthly salaries defendant receives, and which are P50 as an employee of the provincial treasury of Mindoro and P15 as clerk to the parish priest of Calapan, but also a reasonable time within which plaintiff may get another position as teacher, and for which a year and a half from the date when she resigned from her employment as teacher are sufficient; and on this basis plaintiff is sufficiently indemnified by the sum of P540, equivalent to her salary for a year and a half in her former employment as teacher.

In view of the foregoing, the court believes it proper to render judgment in plaintiff’s favor and against the defendant to the effect that she recover from him the sum of P540 in the nature of an indemnity for the damages caused by the loss of her position as teacher, and also the costs of the suit.

In our opinion, the lower court committed neither of the errors complained of by the appellant. His judgment is therefore hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

TANJANCO v. CA 18 SCRA 994 (1966)

FACTS: Arceli Santos and Apolinario Tanjanco are sweethearts. Because of the mans promise to marry the woman, they continually had sexual relationship with each other for a span of one year with the woman's consent. When she got pregnant, he refused to marry her. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child to give her support plus moral and exemplary damages of P100,000. The CFI dismissed the complaint for no cause of action. The CA set aside the CFI decision.

ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth in Art 21.

HELD:  No. In Art 21, the essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry, but connoting essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. The facts stand out that for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. If she had been deceived, she would not have again yield to his embraces, much less for one year. Besides, she is old enough to know better. Hence no case is made under Art 21.